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Poland became an EU member during the 2004 enlargement, but has yet to join the euro. Agata
Gostyńska assesses the first ten years of Polish EU membership and the potential for the country
to take a more central role in EU decision-making. She writes that Poland has made a successful
transition from a ‘junior member state’ to a stronger actor on the EU stage, and that the Eurozone
crisis in particular has allowed the country to take a more active role in EU developments.
Nevertheless, Poland will have to confront future challenges, most notably resolving its position on
the euro and dealing with the potential rebalancing of power brought about through the upcoming
change to Council of the EU voting rules in November.
The sovereign debt crisis has strengthened Poland’s hand in the EU. By shifting attention from east-west divisions to
north-south cleavages, the crisis created surprisingly favourable ground for Poland to mark its presence. A rise in
Polish GDP, growing by 18 per cent in 2012 against 2007 figures, coupled with an acute awareness of the country’s
trade links to the common currency bloc, have given Warsaw extra ammunition as it struggles to ensure that the EU,
and in particular the Eurozone, retain their inclusive character.
This would, of course, have been impossible without Poland’s quick maturation as a member state. Over the past
ten years, Poland grew from the status of junior member state, often perceived as a recalcitrant trouble-maker and
claimant on others’ solidarity, to the position of viable partner. The consolidation of its membership has also been
reflected in the forming of stable coalitions in the EU Council, notably with respect to the multiannual financial
framework, but also in its strong opinions about Europe’s future development – often a domain of the Franco-
German tandem.
Here too it has gained weight. Since 2012, relations
between Paris and Berlin have provided something of a
microcosm for the Eurozone’s broader north-south
tensions, and the two capitals have individually sought
new allies. Poland has benefited directly. One sign of
this was its participation in the Westerwelle Group on
the Future of Europe, otherwise made up mostly by ‘old’
member states. Another has been Paris’s grudging
embrace of the Euro-Plus formula of economic
governance and the cooling of its Neo-Gaullist thinking.
As a result, Poland has navigated the top-down
approach to EU decision-making and the weakening of
the community institutions on which it has long relied.
Germany’s preference for European Council gatherings
damaged the Commission and its hold on the legislative
agenda and has also sidelined the European
Parliament. By sporadic resort to international
agreements – the most recent example being the Single
Resolution Fund – Eurozone members have tested the
integrity of EU law. Yet, Poland has kept its foot in the door.
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This seems, in short, like a coming of age for Warsaw. Poland has long felt uneasy with some of the Commission’s
initiatives – its temptation to tie shale gas exploitation to stringent environmental rules or its proposal on banning
flavoured cigarettes as part of a wider revision of the tobacco products directive. Similarly, the Parliament, with which
Poland developed a strategic partnership on the EU budget framework (MEPs were invited to the informal General
Affairs Council under Polish chairmanship), has not proved particularly amenable to non-euro states.
Talks on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in 2013 are still seen as a watershed moment. After the
Parliament managed to tie deliberations on the SSM to the outcome of parallel negotiations on co-decision dossiers,
its capacity to promote the interests of non-euro members was clear. And the expectation in Warsaw was that it
would do so. After all, Parliament has demanded a proper say in Eurozone affairs on the basis that it represents all
EU citizens. Yet, vocal MEPs tarred the Council compromise as too favourable to non-euro area members like
Poland, citing moral hazard.
All this creates a temptation for Warsaw to abandon its traditional links with the EU institutions, embrace an
intergovernmental Europe and branch out more on its own. And yet, this path would be a mistake. Poland remains
in an intermediate position – not yet a ‘euro-in’ but not a firm ‘euro-out’, not yet an old member but not a new one. It
needs its usual two-track policy based on intergovernmental partnerships and inclusive institutions. Only by
renewing this strategy can it limit the risk of exclusion should the euro members act en bloc – a prospect that may
become more real very soon.
In November 2014 a new voting system favourable to larger member states becomes effective in the EU Council,
potentially accelerating euro area consolidation. Even though the EU’s ongoing north-south divisions make the
emergence of a firm Eurozone core unlikely in the near term, Poland will need a strong European Commission to
diffuse the possible caucus of large member states – even more so should initial signs of Franco-German
rapprochement be confirmed.
Of course, with the waning permissive consensus in the EU, it is difficult to advocate for strong community
institutions. To borrow a phrase from Poland’s Europe Minister ‘visions of a huge European leap… only fuel anti-
European populism’. This explains lukewarm reactions to the idea of Spitzenkandidaten in most EU capitals,
including Warsaw. The nomination of lead candidates by EU party families clearly infers a centralisation of powers.
Yet, it also provides an example of the renewal required from Poland’s two-track policy. Given that backtracking on
this innovation would strain relations with the Parliament, Poland should be ready to offer a different reading of the
idea – one in which political power is dissipated. After all, faced with the necessity to select a joint candidate for the
Commission President, national members of EU-wide party families might be more inclined to cooperate in giving
the necessary underpinning to inter-parliamentary cooperation.
Poland should be prepared to assert its institutional partnerships, which are ripe for diversification. Already, the
European Central Bank (ECB) has emerged as a serious partner to non-euro members, in a way unmatched by the
Commission or Parliament. Recent ECB policy towards Eurozone enlargement, for instance, has been based on an
idea of two-way conditionality: the usual convergence process in candidate countries like Poland, but also an
emphasis on the stability of the euro area reforms.
Prior to the ECB’s shift, Poland found itself having to assure other member states of its intention to adopt the euro
quickly if it wished to retain its influence. Now, with domestic constitutional constraints ever clearer, Poland will need
this extra shield for its policy. The ECB’s thinking paves the way for Poland to prepare its economy for euro area
accession without risking accusations of backtracking, something which on the eve of a new decade of membership
would not bode well.
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